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REDUNDANCY OF HYDRAULIC FLIGHT CONTROL ACTUATORS 
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Boeing Commercial Airplane Company 
The constraint of requiring airplanes to have inhepent aerodynamic 
stability can be removed by using active control systems. 
plane requires control system reliability approaching that of the basic 
airframe. 
ability, but create mechanization and operational problems. 
candidate systems, two different approaches to solving the problems associated 
with redundant actuators appear the most likely to be used in advanced airplane 
control systems. 
The resulting air- 
Redundant control actuators can be used to achieve the required reli- 
Of numerous 
INTRODUCTION 
Future civil aircraft will have to take advantage of all possible gains 
in aerodynamic efficiency and weight reduction to be economically viable. 
has been shown in previous studies by Boeing and others that gains in aero- 
dynamic efficiency and reduction in airplane weight can be achieved by placing 
the center of gravity aft of the longitudinal maneuver point. 
unstable airplane must be augmented through the flight control system to pro= 
vide acceptable handling qualities. 
critical, such that loss of the augmentation would result in loss of the air- 
plane, the control system reliability must approach that of the basic airframe. 
To meet this level of reliability, special consideration must be given to the 
control system design. Such considerations include design simplification, 
derating of components, elimination of electrical connectors, and physical iso- 
lation of electrical wiring and hydraulic power. 
usually required to obtain satisfactory reliability from the complex hydraulic 
actuators and electronic control systems used in airplane flight controls. 
It 
The resulting 
If the stability of the airplane is 
Even then redundancy is 
Use of redundancy to achieve reliability has always been an accepted 
engineering design technique. 
easily realized in control systems because of signal channel interaction, 
failure effects, performance degradation after failures, null shift with chan- 
nel switching and failure detection problems. 
actuators are used to drive a single load, actuator load sharing also becomes 
a concern. Methods of insuring proper load sharing can reduce load reaction 
stiffness, cause poor resolution, and may lead to dynamic instability if not 
properly designed and built. Monitoring used to effect the orderly shutdown 
of failed elements may cause inadvertent shutdown of good elements. All of 
these problem areas with respect to redundant control systems and actuators 
require careful consideration in control system design and mechanization. 
However, the advantages of redundancy are not 
If force voted multiple hydraulic 
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REDUNDAmCY REQUIREMESI'S 
Redundancy requirements for  f l i gh t  control actuation systems can be 
divided in to  two areas, the requirement for  f l u t t e r  free control surfaces and 
the maintenance of c r i t i c a l  control surface operation, 
The need t o  minimize airplane weight reduces the permissible use of 
control surface mass balance as a means of preventing control surface f lu t t e r .  
If mass balance is  not used, the surface must be restrained by the surface 
control system. 
paragraph 25 , 629 , "Flutter, deformation, and fail-safe cr i te r ia , "  requires 
t h a t  an airplane be free from f l u t t e r  after any s ingle  failure i n  the  f l igh t  
control system, plus any other "reasonably probable" single fa i lure  or  mal- 
function affecting f lu t t e r .  
"reasonably probable" by the FAA. Therefore , when airplane design dictates 
tha t  control surfaces be restrained by the surface power actuators t o  avoid 
the  mass balance weight penalty, these requirements d ic ta te  a need fo r  at 
least two surface power actuators and three hydraulic systems for  each surface. 
The Federal Aviation Regulations, Volume 111, Part 25, 
Hydraulic system failures are classif ied as 
Independent of considerations fo r  suppression of surface f l u t t e r ,  surface 
power actuator redundancy is  also influenced by the need t o  maintain control 
of the airplane f l i gh t  path. 
Part 25, paragraph 25.671, requires, i n  par t ,  t ha t  the  airplane must be cap- 
able of' safe f l i gh t  and landing after any single failure, excluding jamming, 
i n  combination w i t h  any probable hydraulic or  e l ec t r i ca l  system failure. 
The Federal Aviation Regulations, Volume 111, 
One form of redundancy t o  assure continuance of control function would 
be t o  use multiple aerodynamic surface segments, independently controlled, 
i n  each airplane axis. 
vention of f l u t t e r ,  each surface could be controlled by a single actuator. 
Degraded, but safe, operation would be possible i f  one or more surface seg- 
ments became inoperable. 
However, i f  t h e  airplane design 1s such t h a t  a limited number of f l ight  
control surfaces are available or i f  erll control surfaces in  an axis are 
needed fo r  flight path control, each surface must remain controllable after 
certain dual control system failures. 
If actuator redundancy were not required fo r  pre- 
This feature is  used i n  some current airplanes. 
Advanced supersonic airplanes w i l l  probably be limited i n  use of control 
surface redundancy, par t icular ly  i n  the longitudinal axis ,  because of the need 
t o  a t t a in  maximum aerodynamic efficiency. 
advanced supersonic transport airplane w i l l  a lso limit the consideration of 
mass balance for  f l u t t e r  prevention. 
t he  minimum redundancy leve l  fo r  surface power actuators and show the  need 
for  redundmcy i n  f l i gh t  control actuation systems. 
The need fo r  minimum weight i n  an 
These two factors are sufficient t o  set 
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ACTUATOR REDUNDANCY MXZAHIZATION 
There are two distinct categories of mechanization applied to redundant 
actuator channels used in aircraft control systems. One type is the parallel 
active configuration, and the other type is the active/standby configuration. 
The principle differences between the two types are as follows: 
a. Since the parallel active technique implies that the control channels 
are working together at some point in the control system, the failure of one 
of the control channels can cause an output performance change, 
active/standby system, the control elements operate independently and failures 
of the active control element causes transfer to a correctly operating staadby 
channel with no performance degradation. 
For an 
b, With a parallel active system all of the control channels are working 
It is not neces- 
at the same time and the failure of one channel is compensated for by the 
remaining correctly operating channels (to varying degrees). 
sary  to rapidly switch the failed channel off. 
mechanization, rapid transfer between control elements is essential (with the 
actual required transfer time being determined by the particular application) 
With an active/standby 
There are three options available in mechanization of parallel active 
The control channels can be brought together and the actuator out- systems, 
puts summed in the following ways: 
a. Force voting 
b, Velocity summing 
C. Position summing 
is the most common technique used in mechanizing parallel 
active systems. 
output representing the mid value of all input commands can be achieved, 
examples of this type of system exist. 
actuators (autoland option), and the GE 68W F-4 roll and yaw secondary actu- 
ators are typical,, One problem with this type of system that does not exist 
with other types is the force fight that can occur between actuator channels 
when channels differ in input command or actuator characteristics, 
By force voting several actuators on a common output, an 
Many 
The Boeing 747 pitch and roll autopilot 
is an alternate parallel active mechanization which does 
ght problems of the force voted systems. 
best example of this method is the electromechanical secondary actuator devel- 
oped by LTV for the 680J F-4 pitch axis.  This mechanization uses servo motors 
Probably the 
differential gear boxes. 
motor velocities and the force output is the sum of the 
Net output velocity is the sum of 
individual force outputs of the servo motors. 
systems have no actuator force fight. However, since 
rs are summed by differential linkage, a channel failure 
or actuator sh duce total output stroke capability. Each fndi- 
vidual actuato larger stroke than the minimum allowable output 
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stroke to accommodate channel failures. This characteristic restricts the 
application of the position summing technique to systems that require only 
small output displacement. 
actuation, 
series actuators on the Grumman F-14. 
more than two actuators are summed because of linkage complexity, 
It has been used in dual systems for series 
Examples are the Boeing 737 dual yaw damper and the dual channel 
Mechanization becomes difficult when 
ACTUATOR REDUNDANCY 1MPI;EMENTATION FACTORS 
There are several factors that must be considered when redundant 
actuators are used. 
tion, operation after failures, and cause interface problems. 
outlined below. 
The most significant are those that affect normal. opera- 
These are 
Failure 1n.sensitivity 
Failure insensitivity is the ability of a redundant control system to 
experience failures and automatically continue operation with an acceptable 
transient, If the system performs a critical function, operation must be 
maintained in the presence of one or more failures; i,e,, be fail operational. 
However, a fail operational system does not insure minimum control system 
transients, 
of the system, 
operational, 
characterisitcs vary as discussed below: 
The criticality of transients has an impact on the detail design 
A l l  four methods of redundancy mechanization can be fail 
However, the number of channels required and failure 
a. 
systems 
With three active channels operation continues after the first failure, With 
four channels operation continues after two failures. In voting systems the 
first failed channel must be disconnected before the second channel fails 
for the system to remain operational. In the force voted systems the failed 
channel is automatically overpowered by the remaining channels and the mag- 
nitude of the failure transient can be insignificant, 
velocity summing provide an averaged output but have inherent failure tran- 
sients and steady state null offset after failure. 
transients is dependent upon the system closed loop response. 
Fail-operational capability can be achieved in parallel active 
by majority voting or averaging three or more active actuators. 
Displacement and 
The magnitude of the 
b, With active/standby systems a failure detection device must assess 
that the active channel has failed, automatically disconnect it, and switch 
to a good channel. 
detection level, the switching time and the tracking of the standby channel. 
The failure transient is dependent upon the failure 
Failure Detection 
Detection and indication of failures during operation must be provided 
so that failed channels or actuators can be disengaged to preserve the integ- 
rity of the system. 
a l l  types of failures; hardover, passive, and oscillatory and slowovers or 
ramps which could produce an unsafe situation. 
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The failure detection system must be designed to detect 
The a b i l i t y  of the fa i  
failures from apparent f a i l  
has an equivalence i n  reliabil 
channel off inadvertently due 
mean-time-between-failure ( s t e m  may be s ignif icant ly  affected. 
system t o  so r t  out legitimate 
occur due t o  adverse tolerances 
failure detection system t r i p s  a 
failure, the  equivalent 
Failures i n  pa ra l l e l  active systems may be sensed by in-line monitoring 
A method of reducing the  number of redundant actuators i s  t o  add 
While 
of actuator character is t ics  o r  by cross channel monitoring between active 
actuators. 
a model of a working c 
t h i s  extends the sgst  
channel, i t s  ef fec t iv  
hardware. In  certain ctuators are large and where weight 
i s  c r i t i c a l ,  the mdel approach 
weight. 
d use it for  cross channel monitoring. 
ional  capabili ty with one less working 
depends on how w e l l  t h e  model matches the actual  
provide a way to minimize the overall  
dby s y s t e ~ s  eac ne1 must be individually monitored fo r  
is  usually duplicated o r  modeled t o  
detect  failure of the  active channel. 
Load sharing f" the  a b i l i t y  of multiple actuators with 
r $n positioning a common output. 
Led actuators since, obviously, there i s  no 
dby system when only one system controls at a 
ident ical  inputs t 
is  a problem pecul 
force f igh t in  
t i m e ,  o r  i n  posi t  d systems where forces of individual 
actuators are additive, 
Load sharing 
Ideally,  it is  desirable tha t  the  load be divided equally among redundant 
actuators t o  eliminate e However, tracking errors  arise due 
t o  tolerance buildup i n  eac 
t h a t  tend t o  make each ac 
commands are identic 
t i on  commands cannot ht  occurs between actuators. 
loop and actuator ins ta l la t ion  
e posit ion even though the input 
ied  t o  a common output a l l  posi- 
To minimize the force ~ i ~ h t i ~  e voted actuator configurations and 
assure acceptable sha methods are c 
control of t h e  fe dback loop of the actuator. 
Amechanical ac t h  good tolerance cont 
of the manufact ossible and the  unchan 
An e lec t r i c  controlled actuator h d path elements such 
as summing amp 
character is t ic  d power, It i s  generally accepted 
tha t  the t o l e r  
s ignif icant ly  l y  controlled 
ck transducers which can change 
Lronically controlled actuator are 
1013 
b. Compliance between channels. In  some applications the s t ruc tura l  
compliance between actuators allows suff ic ient  individual actuator position 
difference t o  reduce force f igh t  through the  normal position feedback loop. 
C. Low force gain actuators. Low pressure gain servovalves can be used 
t o  reduce the force f ight  resul t ing from expected valve command differences 
t o  an acceptable level.  In  some applications a feedkack path consisting of 
deflections of the actuators '  reaction s t ructure  has been suff ic ient  t o  pro- 
vide the actuator force gain reduction, and reduced force fight.  
t o  reduce actuator force gain i s  t o  use actuator pressure as a feedback 
command. 
tolerated without reducing t h e  overal l  actuator s t i f fness  below the  minimum 
allowable level ,  Reducing actuator force gain ( s t i f fnes s )  has been used 
successfully where the  inputs are  reasonably matched, such as a set of sur- 
face power actuators signalled by a common mechanical command, or  i n  secondary 
actuators where the  output load i s  small. 
Another way 
However,there i s  a l i m i t  t o  the amount of compliance tha t  can be 
d. Equalization t o  average load. For cases where the. actuators are 
required t o  operate in to  large aerodynamic loads and have uncontrolled input 
mismatch, any pressure feedback system requipes modification t o  be useful. 
The individual actuator load must be compared t o  the average load. 
of the average load and the individual difference from average requires cross 
channel comparison. Th i s  method does not degrade actuator s t i f fnes s  but adds 
complexity and introduces the  poss jb i l i ty  of cross channel failures. 
Computation 
Input Mismatch 
Differences i n  commands (input mismatch) due t o  tolerances i n  an 
e l ec t r i ca l  control system, from sensor t o  actuator,  can be quite high, as 
much as a quarter of f u l l  scale  command, unless some design precautions are 
taken t o  prevent such buildup. It should be noted tha t  differences i n  com- 
mands generated by actuator loop tolerances are an order of magnitude less 
than those generated by computational elements i n  the upstream portions of 
the system. 
w i t h  the input mismatch problem as itemized below, 
The various methods of redundant actuator mechanization deal 
a. Force Voting Systems. In  force voted systems the output is  the  mid 
value of all input commands. The force fight tha t  occurs due to input com- 
mand mismatch can be reduced by the same methods used t o  insure load sharing. 
In  some applications the only possible means of controll ing command differ-  
ences may be the  use of electronic signal conditioning t o  reduce the  input 
mismatch 
be  Velocity Summing Systems. Velocity summed actuators allow the 
individual channels t o  cancel command differences by d i f fe ren t ia l ly  summing 
rates.  
C. Position Summing Systems. Position summed actuators give a single 
output which is  the average of the  input commands. 
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d. Active/Standby Systems. Usually the active actuator is commanded 
by a single electronic channel and mismatch is of no concern during operation. 
Mismatches between the commands of the active and the standby channel are of 
concern, however, and must be minimized to avoid large surface transients 
upon switching from active to standby actuators, 
SECONDARY ACTUATORS 
Surface actuator input signals can be either electrical or mechanical. 
A dual load path mechanical signal to three power actuators can satisfy all 
reliability requirements. 
augmentation or fly-by-wire systems will be electrical. 
However, the control signals for critical stability 
The power associated with the electronic signals for fly-by-wire command, 
These low level signals are required to command sur- 
To transform the electrical 
autopilot, and stability augmentation systems must be kept at low levels as 
a matter of good design. 
face actuators that operate at high power 1evel.s. 
commands to surface displacements controlled by large hydraulic power actuators 
requires several stages of amplification, Review of current redundant flight 
control actuation systems shows an almost universal use of small electrically 
signaled hydraulic actuators as one of the stages of amplification. 
small actuators are termed secondary actuators. 
These 
It is advantageous to treat the command path and computation and power 
actuation errors independently by inserting a synchronizing stage between the 
two functions. 
may be an electronic voter or a mechanical output of a secondary actuator 
arrangement, Some of the advantages of synchronizing are: 
The synchronizing stage provides a single valued command and 
a. When surface power actuators are isolated from the upstream command 
differences, the task of providing adequate power actuator load sharing 
becomes easier, permitting a simpler and more reliable mechanization, 
b. When secondary actuators are used to provide the synchronizing stage 
they do not eliminate the problems of redundant actuators but the magnitude 
of the problems are less severe because the secondary actuators operate at 
significantly lower force levels than the surface power actuators. 
SYSTEM SELECTION 
Four types of actuator redundancy have been discussed, It has also been 
shown that prevailing control system designs use secondary actuators as a 
stage of signal amplification and as a means of command path synchronization, 
Surface power actuators are usually force voted mechanical input actuators. 
The system differences are in the redundancy mechanization of the secondary 
actuators. 
margin with force voted systems the most common, 
Active/standby and force voted systems predominate by a large 
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Although the use of velocity summing solves the problem of force fight 
there are disadvantages which make this type of system a questionable candi- 
date for future use in critical flight control applications on civil aircraft. 
The complex gearing could make it difficult to prove that jam-type failures 
would be extremely remote, as required by FAA regulations, Also, for the same 
output force the electromechanical actuator is larger and heavier than an 
equivalent electrohydraulic actuator. One advantage would be the availability 
of four independent actuator signals in an airplane with only three hydraulic 
signals. Another advantage for military aircraft is the reduced vulnerability 
to loss of hydraulic systems. 
Position summed systems are difficult to mechanize for more than two 
redundant channels because of the complex linkage required. 
loss of rate and travel capability after failure and the inherent output 
position transient that occurs with failure are also disadvantages, 
In addition the 
The active/standby and the force voted systems have advantages and 
disadvantages that must be considered in conjunction with the specific air- 
plane and control system application. The most significant differences 
between the two types of systems are: 
Normal Performance 
The single channel operation of the active/standby system can give 
optimum performance. 
can affect output resolution and reduce actuator stiffness, 
In the force voted system residual actuator force fight 
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Failure Transients 
Force voted systems can be mechanized to give very small failure 
transients. 
and nuisance trips against the allowable failure transient. 
The active/standby system must trade failure detection levels 
Performance After Failure 
The active standby systems preserve normal performance in the failure 
sequence from the active channel to the standby channel and on to the second 
stand6y channel. 
as it fails down. 
capability and force output. 
The force voted system may suffer a performance degradation 
This degradation can be exhibited as reduced resolution 
Failure Detection 
The active/standby concept requires immediate failure detection to be 
safe following failures, 
detection of a failure to be safe. 
enable a failed channel to be shut dawn before another failure occurs. 
The force voted concept does not require immediate 
Failure detection is only required to 
Each standby channel must be continually monitored to assure that it is 
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capable of control i f  the active channel fails ,  Further, somewhere i n  the 
system a device l i k e  a switch o r  blocking valve is required t o  operate w i t h -  
out pr ior  knowledge of i t s  condition t o  provide a successful t ransfer  t o  a 
standby channel, 
continually monitoring each other and require no immediate switching t o  be 
safe. 
’ 
Force voted systems are comprised of only active channels 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Advanced technology airplanes w i l l  require redundant f l i gh t  control 
actuators t o  achieve r e l i a b i l i t y  because operational s t a b i l i t y  augmentation 
system w i l l  be essent ia l  for  safe f l i gh t  and acceptable airplane handling 
qual i t ies ,  
Surface res t ra in t  t o  m e e t  t h e  fa i l  safe requirements for  f l u t t e r -  
prevention and min imum safe control labi l i ty  requirements w i l l  d ic ta te  ;the 
minimum redundancy levels  f o r  control surface power actuators Airplanes 
with redundant f l i gh t  control surfaces may have dual surface power actuators 
i f  a th i rd  hydraulic system i s  provided, Control surfaces t h a t  are c r i t i c a l  
for  control functions w i l l  require at  leas t  three actuators per surface i n  
order t o  meet FAA requirements and provide an adequate level of safety, 
Rel iabi l i ty  requirements for  control systems t h a t  amplify autopilot, 
s t a b i l i t y  augmentation, and p i lo t  commands and provide inputs t o  the  control 
surface power actuators are determined by the need t o  remain operational i n  
sp i t e  of control channel malfunctions. Actuation systems w i t h  f au l t  cor- 
rective capability t h a t  w i l l  meet the system r e l i a b i l i t y  requirements and 
sa t i s fy  FAA regulations require a t  least four active channels or  three mon- 
i tored channels, Surface power actuators could be mechanized with t h i s  level  
of redundancy but it has been found t o  be more e f f ic ien t  t o  u t i l i z e  small 
secondary actuators t o  provide a rel iable  single valued mechanical input t o  
three surface power actuators of reduced complexity, 
Based on a review and examination of current redundant actuation systems, 
two concepts were found t o  be representative of secondary actuator mechani- 
zation which meet advanced c i v i l  airplane f l i gh t  control system requirements. 
The two actuator configurations are a four channel force voted system and 
a three channel active/standby system. 
considered since they reflect different design philosophies. 
Both of these systems should be 
Redundant control systems have operating and fa i lure  characterist ics t h a t  
are affected by overall  control system and airplane design. 
t o r s  should be studied i n  conjunction w i t h  p i lo t  and airplane t o  understand 
p i lo t  reaction and airplane response t o  variations i n  control system charac- 
t e r i s t i c s  and fai lures .  
Redundant actua- 
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